

RECONSIDERING 'THE PROBLEMATIC OF QUOTATION' IN DERRIDA

AREEJ M.J. AL-KHAFAJI

The Centre of Translation and Language Studies / Al-Qadisiya University, Iraq

Visiting Scholar, ENCAP, Cardiff University, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT

In the structure quotation-text (signifier-signified), the text is as the Father figure in psychoanalysis; it dominates the quotation, castrates its multi-meanings into a single intended meaning, depriving it from its ideological rights in the original text, restricting it in a closed context. The quoter claims the quotation forcefully, possessing it, manipulating it by turning it into a mere excerpt rather than a text in the poststructuralist sense of the word. Quoting does not usually refer to the original context, it is no longer a main text (citable and iterable), but a noniterable quoted text. It follows a structuralist sign-model and deductive logic. So it cannot be différant (different or deferral), rather it is a definite reported speech, quoted to emphasize its self-identity the way the writer of the new text sees it.

KEYWORDS: *Quotation, Text, Poststructuralism, Psychoanalysis, Derrida, Deconstruction.*

Received: Sep 26, 2016; **Accepted:** Oct 13, 2016; **Published:** Oct 15, 2016; **Paper Id.:** IJELOCT20168

INTRODUCTION

Allowing another to speak legitimately on the behalf of the author, enabling double subjects to reflect on the same object, introducing intrinsic presence via the form of direct quotation in the midst of the author's presumed absence from his writing are some of the key functions that quotations perform when authors insert into their texts what other authors say between quotation marks. Adopting somebody else's words is like adopting children; pretending that they are yours, unaware you enfold your text with hybrid identities, double contexts, heterogeneous traces, and unsettled signatures. The confusion becomes even more difficult in modernist and postmodernist texts where signatures of the quoted authors and quotation marks are erased. In *Citation and Modernity: Derrida, Joyce and Brecht* (1993), Claudette Sartiliot calls to break with the classical definition of quotation as a mere 'ornament' or 'appendage to the main text', and forward instead a new 'disseminative' definition based on Derrida's principal thoughts.¹According to Derrida, language is no longer 'lawfully possessed' by speakers or writers, the boundaries between texts are blurred, there is no 'inside' or 'outside' of texts, authorship is impossible, and reading is far from being a unitary process because it is outside 'referentiality'; i.e. there is 'no absolute correlation between the name and the thing it designates'. All this led both writers and readers into the 'library [labyrinth] of Babel' where unlimited 'confusion of voices' and 'regression of origins' make meaning 'indefinitely deferred', or in 'the impossibility of finishing' and 'totalizing'.²The cited words are disseminated as flying seeds, which are impregnated with new life and new meaning. However, the classical notion of quotation cannot be totally effaced or inadequated even for Derrida as this paper is attempting to show. Quoting is not a différant mode of writing in which the quotation is still a closed signifier identical with univocal transcendental signified (one meaning advocated by the quoter himself), in addition to the other open signifiers of the main text. This sense of double signification is desirable to consolidate the argument of the text, a tradition that shaped our epistemic culture as it is originally derived from the natural psychic habit of reinforcing knowledge by

repetition. It signals the integrative efforts of writing (main text) and speech (direct quotation) to convey reliable meanings. The main text still has its roots in the phonological foundation of the quotation and the quotation retains authority from its intentional and deterministic point of reference.

The quotation harbours a target meaning which could be totally different from the source meaning. Usually the target meaning of the quotation, which is taken out of the original context, is accepted unquestionably by the readers of the new text.³ It is simply the insertion of a trustworthy narrative into new discourse, making out of the quotation a catalysis that would hasten the process of convincing the readers about the message of the new text. Yet, the mixture of two authors in one discourse creates a special cognitive difficulty in the process of its reading. If we assume the death (absence) of the author of the new text (a premise built on Blanchot, Barthes and Derrida), we cannot pretend the same kind of disappearing condition to the quoted author whose name and date of publication are openly mentioned in the typical quotation-form, in addition to his exact words and their intention to the main author.⁴ Blanchot's meditation on the 'death-temptation' of literature, its 'annihilating' power of naming an author, Barthes' manifestoic declaration that writing is the destruction of every 'voice' or 'origin' and Derrida's distinction between speech as 'full presence' and writing as 'absence' are not effective with the quotation-sentence whose subject (quotee's name) is directly related to its predicate (saying his own words). The subject-predicate sentence form refers to the two elemental functions of language: 'the function of reference and the function of predication'.⁵ The reference expression, which links the name of the quoted author directly to what he says, indicates that he performs the action of issuing an utterance.⁶ He is centred as the utterance-origin, the one who does the illocutionary action, but quoting particularly authorial words to focus certain meaning is the total responsibility of the new text's author. Aware of his absence, either by death or not being nearby to answer for what he writes, the quoter consciously selects certain speech aspects to supply evidential basis to his text. He assumes the presence of a virtual sender (with real name and exact words) and himself as receiver, deciphering certain coded message and communicating this message to us by erasing the otherness of the quotee. He would escape from the Levinasian moral responsibility to the other, from the grip of the quotation's prior interpretation by pretending that it is part of his text (Derrida's saying, 'there is no outside text,' context), in order that the quotation remains forever at the text's full capture. Thus, in spite of Derrida's argument against intentionality, the quoter receives an intention from the quotee and he builds his argument on this perceived intention. Constructing understanding the text on prior understanding of the quotation first makes the quotation the origin of meaning in any reading of the text. Hence the quotation's paradigmatic signifying system, or its single style and single world-view create a problem for reading which is governed by poststructuralist scepticism about the possibility of having a stabilized or fixed meaning for a text.

The quotation is a kind of distancing certain words away from their original text and reterritorialising them in a new one. This paper is not concerned with quotability, Derrida's 'iterability', or 'citationality', the capability of the linguistic and non-linguistic signs to be 'repeated - to be iterable and citational',⁷ but with its aftermath, the quotation itself and its function inside a new territory (the quotation as quotation within a totally different from the original text). Derrida says that every 'written syntagma', due to its 'spacing which separates it from other elements of the internal contextual chain', 'can always be detached from the chain in which it is inserted or given without causing it to lose all possibility of functioning ... by inscribing it or grafting it into other chains'. This supplies writing with 'its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)'.⁸ However, the quotation is a portion of the written text which is detached from the chain in which it is originally inserted and inscribed in an absolutely different chain and here it loses its iterability, it becomes a code of communication within a specific context. Derrida rejects 'context' because it involves philosophical assumptions of a

deterministic nature; i.e. he refutes the contextualization and determination of meaning, but the quotation supplies a fixed context; it is a type of discourse whose function is to communicate sense (meaning) as well as reference (naming the original utterer of the saying or referring to its pseudo-origin). Iterability functions in the absence of referent, signified meaning and intention to signify, but what if this tripartite is present as we can find in the quotation as a quotation? It is a non-iterable 'signifying form' for the real object (referent) of the quoted utterance is the utterance itself which carries on the quoter's meaning and intention to signify. The utterance is both signifier and referent that is present to the person who quotes it and to the one who receives it. Thus, the quotation, as a sign, is not generative of other signs because it lacks iterability, it cannot be cited or quoted from the quotation; it cannot be repeated with different/deferral meanings because the signified is present. The quotation is forcefully claimed by the quoter who seizes, or expropriates it from its original source as a phallic father breaking the connection between mother (original text) and Oedipus (the quotation), castrating the quotation by removing it from its first context and giving it a new singular identity, or perfect representation in the new text. 'Through quotation', said Sartre, 'the "belated" writer attempts to eclipse the precursor (the light of the sun), to castrate the precursor; he appropriates his pen/penis and thus asserts his ability to (pro) create, to inseminate in his turn'.⁹ So the quotation is a shift from a pre-Oedipal semiotic gesture into a post-Oedipal symbolic law of paternal imperialism or colonisation of the quoted text's original meaning. And as a slave or a marginalised nation / class / gender, the quotation loses its own freedom in the domination of the new text. In the structure quotation-text, the text is open, does not have a stable meaning, but reading the quotation should always follow slavishly the reading of the text. It will never be liberated from the monopoly or mastery of the new author whose present 'self' is decentralised,¹ so he subjugates the quotation, the other to find a compensative reliable voice. As the super-ego which modulates the unconscious, the text puts the quotation under its determinative laws; thus, the text's masculine possession of the feminine quotation illuminates their conflicting onto-hermeneutic perceptions. And analysing the quotation as a sign should not be detached from its teleological and metaphysical prospects.

The Quotation/Text

The quotation/text dichotomy entails diverse expository structures or patterns that adhere to contradictory ontological and theological demands. While the author of the text 'has the gift of indirect speech', operating with language and being outside it,¹⁰ the quotation is a direct 'expositive' speech act, which is revealed in a declarative sentence type to convey either true, or false information. It is a verbatim stated as an ontological fact-being-there, the writer approves its existence and as a theological God, he imposes its being (meaning) on the mind of the reader. The quoter puts the quotation the one-way he sees it, and he sees it from a one-sided mirror as a narcissistic reflection of his own point of view, the view that supports his own argument in the main text. When he says that somebody else says, argues, affirms, etc. something between quotation marks, the saying is involved with a question of Being, it borrows a state of proximity to the other, immediacy built, in pre-Derridean philosophy, on 'the essence of the phone', which 'would be immediately proximate to that which within "thought" as logos relates to "meaning", produces it, receives it, speaks it, "composes" it'.¹¹ Hence, in the quotation, there is no suspicion of the intended meaning because it is built on the event of 'hearing/understanding' someone speaks. The quotation is interior to the text rather than exterior; interior in the sense that it provides essence, or onto-theological presence assumed in the midst of the absence metaphysics of the main text. It unquestionably prevents any attempt on the part of the reader to rethink the meaning of the quotation though he finds himself totally free to speculate on the meaning of the text itself. The revival of unitary meaning indicates that the logos, 'the tradition of presence' can find a way out of Derrida's restructuring the relationship between speech/writing and

presence/absence to retrieve its traditional stance in the centre of metaphysical philosophy; i.e. writing is not only a lost presence of one author but a presence of another minor/quoted author. While writing conveys the absence of a speaker, quoting, as a direct speech, witnesses the presence of another. The quoted words refer to an inescapable fundamental centre, the name of the quotee whose consciousness, as imagined by the quoter, is represented in positive logocentric metaphysics of presence. This means that Plato, who is constantly theologized, is still ruling even after all Derrida's success to undermine logocentrism. The logos is inescapable even for Derrida who was well aware that he might be 'constantly risking falling back within what is being deconstructed' in his writings.¹² And because he could not erase the logocentric tradition totally, the logos can be written 'under erasure', as Spivak translates it: 'a word', crossed out by Derrida, 'yet both deletion and word stand', which is an essential part of Heidegger's legacy.

The quotation and the text contradict each other semiotically for they have different ways of writing/reading their signs, which reflect various categories of truth in philosophical discourse. While Derrida deconstructs the structure of the traditional sign totally by rejecting its conceptual transcendental signified in favour of plural readings (*différance*), the quotation as signifier does not signal a structure of difference or the deferral. On the contrary, it follows the one meaning the quoter wants to emphasise. Evoking the linguistic meaning of the quotation raises important philosophical issues, resulting from our exposure to the use of language and the traps that it sets before us. Unlike the text, the quotation is framed declaratively, its subject is invoked directly as an absolute articulator of the one stated truth. Thus, in the quotation, writing and reading are faithful to each other. The quotation is a 'readerly' text rather than a 'writerly' text. Its reading is an innocent process rather than guilty because it is a closed text, not open or indecipherable. There is no plurality of meaning in the quotation, or no controversy between the written meaning and read meaning.² The deconstructive strategy is working on the text, which connotes infinite controversial readings, but not on the quotation within the text which is originally structured to carry on one definite meaning. The quotation is generally a syntagmatic paradigm coded by the quoter to support the network of his textual signifiers, a canonical classical text read but not written, a theological text of restricted singular meaning and chronological time. Its past (text), present (quotation) and future (zero) are unblemished. Its aim is to provide denotative information and naive satisfying 'pleasure' rather than cathartic 'jouissance' (bliss) to the consuming reader.³ It is static, irreversible, following a logico-temporal order. It is an inescapable manifestation of the 'monologic' discourse of direct true/false communication. In Aristotle's logic, the meaning of the quotation is either (A) or (not A); no more than one meaning at a time according to the way the quoter sees it in his discussion. The symbolic formula of the quotation in the language of formal logic is (0-1), in which (1) represents the one meaning the quoter wants to convey and (0) is non-meaning for the existence of (1) in the quotation prohibits or castrates all other meanings. The meaning of (1) is the quoter's process of prohibition or castration of all but one meaning from the quotation itself which becomes a kind of 'God, Law, Definition', a new logos to the writer and reader. Thus, where Derrida subscribes mobility and plurality of meaning to the text which is a subject of 'citationality or iterability',¹³ he adheres to stability and unity (noniterability) in the quotation which becomes meaningful only within the (0-1) logocentric metaphysics of presence (quoted speech). The text which plays always in the future needs a quotation situated in the present of the phonic hearing/understanding of somebody speaks. *The quotation-text structure is a species of writing that still needs speech to integrate its circuit of meaning.* Writing returns from Derrida's excursion out of the 'world-origin', as he calls the logos, back to an 'originary speech' which is 'itself shielded from interpretation'.¹⁴ The quotation retains, in spite of Derrida, the licence of the 'phone'. When Derrida quotes, he preserves the metaphysics of presence, the fixed form and stable meaning. In his texts, he is looking forward to future meanings which are originally built on the always present time

of the quotations. Thus, the quotation is not nihilistic and it cannot be so if the quoter relies on it, negatively or positively, to prove his point of view. It will not be the zero, nothingness in the formula (0-1). Derrida builds his main thesis on the being (meaning) of the quotation to eliminate the significance of (1), or the unitary meaning, turning the Aristotelian formula, according to Kristeva into (0-2).¹⁵ Thus, he builds his notion of the illogical (the im-possible) on Aristotelian logic. The established meaning of the quotation is a preliminary step towards a new logic of instability and volatility of meaning. The transitory or becoming meaning is drawn from the fixed quotation. In this sense, the (1) cannot be deleted totally because it still refers to the experience of being (meaning) as presence, speech, direct quotation.

The Quotation/Text in Derrida

Deconstruction and the Quotation

Reversal to a prior text is a pre-requisite in the quotation-text structure and an inescapable premise for deconstruction which rationally (away from the indeterminacy of Derrida's disagreement with what deconstruction 'is' or deconstruction 'is not') can be characterized as a quotation-based strategy of (re)reading 'untypical meanings' in earlier texts. He 'insists', says Christopher Norris, 'that there is no substitute for the hard work of reading and re-reading texts (his own texts included).'¹⁶ Derrida builds his deconstructive method on the self-present natural voice of the quotee, or the direct and immediate representation of the meaning that the quoter attempts to deconstruct. In the first part of his *Of Grammatology* (1967), he announces the 'death of speech (of a so-called full speech) and a new mutation in the history of writing, in history as writing';¹⁷ however, he provides helpful research devices to critique his text that shows ambivalence in the use of 'language and approach'. Notice the following example:¹⁸

Table 1

Aristotle:	'Spoken words ... are the symbols of mental experience ... and written words are the symbols of spoken words'.
Saussure:	'Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first'.
Derrida:	'Saussure takes up the traditional definition of writing which, already in Plato and Aristotle, was restricted to the model of phonetic script and the language of words'.

The cornerstone in Derrida's argument is a verbatim replication of Aristotle's and Saussure's exact wording, so there is 'inconsistency' between the 'distinctiveness' of his examples and the 'generality' of his argument. Although Derrida demands that critical reading should free itself from the boundaries of time, disturb the long tranquil history of ideas and focus on the question of the text, he builds his new method of critical reading (deconstruction) on freezing the texts of some other authors like Plato, Rousseau, Nietzsche, Saussure, Freud, Levi-Strauss, Husserl, Heidegger and others by quoting them lengthily. Derrida's is supposed to be one way of reading these texts, but his reading seizes life from the texts by quoting them at length. His writing is not far from a quoter-quotee dialogic discourse, but it is headed the one way that he wants to convince his readers to follow. Although Derrida, sceptically sometimes ironically, suspects the centrality of speech in the writings of Western philosophers, he takes their language seriously. He quotes their words, and his quotations produce authority, the authority and centrality of a direct speech that are lent to the quoter himself. So, he suspends the contexts of other authors, breaks into their texts making 'thought-fragments' out of them to provide a pretext for not thinking about the central question, who is speaking in the quotation, the quoter or the quotee? For Derrida, 'one should find a direct line of communication and find oneself on the right track'.¹⁹ The 'right track' which the readers of Derrida should follow to investigate the origin of his quotations is what they can find in a real quotation and to follow the present as well as erased traces in the structure of the quoted words. While there are certain traces in the codification of the

quotations that are directly related to the original writer such as his proper name, the date of his publication and the exact words quoted, some other traces are controlled by the quoter like the selection of specific words from the original text, additions, ellipses and writing significant words in italics. Dating, which is 'signing', according to Derrida, and the quotee's proper name that is supposed to provide a source to the utterance or a signature, are both manipulated by the quoter. In his "What is an Author?" Foucault refers to the problematic of using an author's name and 'how does it function?' Foucault uses Searle's analysis that Derrida deconstructs in *Limited INC* (1988), saying that the author's proper name is 'the equivalent of a description'.²⁰ It indicates the kind of texts written by a certain author. The name has a 'certain link' to what it names. Thus, there is a relation stretching from the name to the text, but in a quotation the relation stretches from the original text to the name. As Derrida says, in his "Signsponge", it is not a question of who writes, but what he writes.²¹ The 'event of signature' turns the text into a thing, a 'Francis-Ponge-text,' and the 'paraph' (the first two letters signed) would be part of that thing, or part of the 'textual material'. 'The stony monumentalisation of the name', says Derrida, 'was a way of losing the name'.²² But if Derrida puts into question 'the link (be it natural or contractual) between a given text, a given so-called author, and his name designated as proper',²³ what about the name of an author and portion of his original text inserted in a completely new text signed by a different author? The quoter's text manipulates another minor text of a specific viewpoint or intention and a name (signature) which are used as parts of the quoted 'textual material'. The signature, in this sense, does not refer to a particular person who possesses the copyright of the original text, but it is a textual sign which carries semantic implications related directly to understanding the signified meaning behind the selected quotation. For instance, in the first example, some implied meanings can be fathomed such as: Aristotle and Plato (the founders of the logos), Saussure (the defender of the logos) and Derrida (the deconstructionist of the logos). Thus, the quotee's name becomes a thing designated in the third person singular, referring to specific meaning which he is the only one to say it. Although, according to Derrida, 'no philosopher will have signed his name', 'every philosopher denies the idiom of his name' because the signature turns the text 'into a legendary, proverbial, oracular inscription', the perfect future turns into a past tense in the quotation when the quoter doubles the signature of the quotee so that the two signatures 'end up as somewhat the same'. Doubling the same signature means that the original and the copy 'do not, in any case, lend themselves to a simple distinction'.²⁴ The quoter signs off what the quotee signs up. He claims its otherness, pretending that the quoted signature his own signature or 'countersignature'.⁴ In terms of authorship, the quotation is excluded from its original text and included in a new one where it loses its origin. Thus, the utterance-origin is retrieved not through the writer who appended his signature at the end of his original text, but the writer who does the action of uttering, i.e., the quoter. He makes out of the quotation a representative signifier, representing the self-present voice who says something the quoter selects deliberately and sometimes he even makes slight changes on the original text to be not itself anymore such as adding, deleting or writing certain words in italics to emphasise a particular point in a discussion built on the quotation he modified. 'Countersignature' can be seen in the following quotation from Derrida's *Of Grammatology* where he violates Saussure's original text, in *Course in General Linguistics*, totally:

I shall call it [grammatology] Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of [that] general science . . . ; the laws discovered by [grammatology] will be applicable to linguistics.

Derrida switched Saussure's 'semiology' to his 'grammatology', to foreshadow the future monopoly of a new 'science of writing' in the same way Saussure pioneered a whole era of semiological studies, making a really puzzling question of whose words are these, Saussure's or Derrida's (or may be both)? As a matter of fact, in the quotation, there is

no 'simple origin', the indication of origin becomes untraceable. And, since the quotation is solely a presence structure, it is no longer a trace, it is a non-traced sign. The quoter forces the quotation to point out to a presence not a trace of an absent presence. He builds his argument on the hypothesis that the arche-trace or origin of the quoted text is not far behind and it is not capable of being erased, so for him the originary trace does not disappear from the quoted text. The quotation, in this sense, is converted into a sign of a missing signature, a 'purloined letter' that will never return to its original 'sender'.⁵ This means that the logic of writing is contradictory with the logic of quoting, they follow double strategies. While writing contains the tools of its own critique, iterability and différance within itself, the quotation has text-authority, its originary trace which is not its origin anymore, its present voice and one unquestionable meaning. Writing is exercising with a text of absence ('absence of signatory,' and 'absence of referent') whose reliability depends on the ontological presence of a speaking subject in the quotation within the text. It is a manifestation of a pre-critical text, a revival of the old language of closure, finite meaning and exactitude, it is a 'return to the Book' (to 'God' or to 'passion of the origin),⁶ to the 'tradition of presence' as opposed to the 'tradition of difference'. *Writing, i.e., is an absent authorship which is completed and supported by the presence nature of the quotation as a reported speech.*

Derrida enquires whether deconstruction deserves being reputed 'of treating things obliquely, indirectly, in indirect style, with so many 'quotation marks''.²⁵ Quotation marks are non-alphabetic graphemes, like all other punctuation marks, they are 'signs' that make 'signs', or guidelines for readers to pause, think, and space the texts they are reading. They are similar to 'the parergon', or an 'integral component ... to the complete representation of the object'.²⁶ Originally, they were based on performance, reading in a loud voice and they are still markers of other voices speaking besides the main author of the text who manipulates them. They are 'outside' voices or thoughts which are included 'inside' and intended to be the heart of argument in the new text. The writer can paraphrase the quoted words, but he quotes the exact words of some authorial voice to make the reader stop, think of the quoted words and usually share the quoter's attitude to them. There is a very big difference between the presence and absence of quotation marks; thus, they are essential for Derrida's deconstruction. He relies upon the difference between direct and indirect speech; paraphrasing the words of certain authors means a new creation not an exact copy of the same old words. Yet the quoter repeats words not contexts because, according to Derrida, 'exact repetition' from the original text is impossible, he reconstructs the quotation in the text to communicate to future readers a particular attitude to the writers that he quotes. They are not the same old words, they change their intended meaning. Hence, the quotation is a detour from the straightforwardness of the text, a shift of the quotee, in the 'politics of reading', from a sole 'subject' into 'responsible subject'. A genuine example of this shift is the contradictory interpretive views of Nietzsche's writings whether they are proto-Nazi or not, which 'make Nietzsche directly responsible for subsequent uses of his teaching'.²⁷ The responsibility of Nietzsche stems from 'the primary reality of speech and the sense of a speaker's "presence" behind his words'.²⁸ When he is quoted, what matters is his voice not his text which is sometimes changed by his quoters to suit their purposes. Thus, in the linearity of text-quotation-deconstruction, the deconstructionists use the centrality and reliability of quoting other authors to contradict deliberately their intended meanings. Derrida presupposes that 'deconstructive questioning or meta questioning', is built basically on 'the task of a historical and interpretive memory'.²⁹ For instance, when he says: 'let us recall the Aristotelian definition', his expression, 'recall' means 'tracing', 'expressing', 'representing' or 'rendering present.' The 'recall', then, is a sound-thought, a Saussurean model of the sign, interpreted according to the linguistic science of words. He experiments with historicising the use of quoted words, or an achronising them, 'words that come to life in my memory ... a memory, then, that likes to give itself over to the return of ghosts'. Aristotle, for Derrida, is one of thousands of ghosts (spectres)

who function in 'a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generation'.³⁰ Although those ghosts are no longer engaged with the present, there are two types of present for Derrida, 'past present, actual present: "now", future present,' While the text enjoys an everlasting future present, the quotation is restricted in the text's 'now', its past present; i.e. it will not change its meaning within the limits that the text decides. Unlike his texts, his quotations lose the 'effect of the "destinational structure", the address to an unknown future readership'.³¹ Recalling the words of certain spectres gives the saying 'flesh and phenomenality', says Derrida, it has language and voice that are animated. The quotation as a 'living speech', 'phonological foundation' or 'phonologism' still refers to 'the interiority of the soul, the living self-presence of the soul within the true logos, the help that speech lends to itself'.³² As 'writing was the clothing of speech', in traditional philosophy, the text is still the clothing of the quotation in Derridean thought. It has a mutual relationship or collaborative division with the text, as he says: 'The meaning of the outside [text] was always present within the inside [quotation], imprisoned outside the outside, and vice versa'. The quotation, in Derrida's text, is an institutional sign of the centrality and reliability of the voice. Thus 'ears are necessary to receive the good news that [the voice] blows', says Christopher Wise.³³

Deconstructing Derrida

Derrida's is a heavy quoting style, especially in his early books, in which he depends on (re)reading slowly and carefully significant prior texts where he negates something more real than other men and their words; rather, he puts everything into question. His writing which is built on quotation/counter-quotation discussion stirred academic curiosity about the onto-theological meaning of quotation. Hence, came Marjorie Garber's *Quotation Marks* (2003) and Ruth Finnegan's *Why Do We Quote?* (2011). In her discussion of the world's engagement with quotations in language and culture, Garber says: 'The quotation creates authority by its very nature and form.... It imparts that authority, temporarily, to the speaker or the writer'. For her, encircling an 'original' saying between quotation marks raises 'a real question about the relationship of quotation marks ... to speech'. 'These typographical practices', writes Garber, 'all have consequences, not only for how passages are read with the eye, but also for how they are read aloud. And this in turn will affect their cultural currency, the way in which they are valued'.³⁴ Quotation marks; i.e. lend the saying authority and reliability which would put what is said out of question. For Finnegan, the discrepancy between direct and indirect speech is 'not just grammar but an immutable law of the universe'. In the quoted statements, there is a focus on the 'here and now' not only of the original text, but a situational 'here and now', a metaphysical new presence presumed by the quoter as he repeats the words of others. 'The shape of the visual signs', in the quotation is accompanied with the voice of 'particular divine and human agents'. Thus, 'the discourse', says Finnegan, 'is carrying the voices of both a given character and of the controlling narrator, the two seeping into each other. This double-voicedness has been most visibly displayed as deliberate style in novels'.³⁵ Usually, in narratives as in any other multi-voiced discourse, there is a distinction between 'direct authorial ... narration' and 'the stylistically individualized speech of characters', providing 'diversity of languages' to the same text.⁷ When a writer (as Derrida for instance) echoes the words of others, we read his text as an assemblage of intertextual communication or a multi-voiced dialogue between him and the writers he quotes. However, in this dialogue, the quoter (as a fictive omniscient narrator) is free to put characters and words the way he wants, he turns the quotees into passive characters in his textual narrative, he restricts them in a specific place and time, the 'here and now' of the quotation as quotation. As he puts their words on stage, they say no more than the words that he wants. Derrida i.e. prevents any kind of dialogue between himself, as a reader, and the quoted authors because he prohibits any other meaning but the meaning that he wants to convey through the quotations. He canonises this one single interpretation, *turning the quotation from a written text into a direct speech*, or a spoken word to which philosophers, from 'Plato to Hegel' and 'from the pre-Socratic to

Heidegger', 'assigned the origin of truth in general'.³⁶ While his text is 'in the future and always will be in the future', Derrida says his last word about the quotation. He separates the quotations from their 'surrounding words', and circles them between academically acknowledged signals (quotation marks) which are authorised by the rules of logic and grammar. The grammaticality of the quotation validates its situational metaphysical presence, the 'here and now' of the quotation's absolutism that is canonised by Derrida himself. Thus, as Nietzsche has said, though playfully, 'we will never get rid of God because we still believe in grammar',³⁷ or because commonplace grammar (ordered logic) is the unconscious source of metaphysics. Although, for Derrida, Nietzsche is the first western thinker who, even before Heidegger, 'contributed a great deal to the liberation of the signifier from its dependence or derivation with respect to the logos', he concludes that modern reason (its new genealogy of knowledge) cannot do 'without "presuppositions" that guide the understanding in decisive ways'.³⁸ Thus, grammar; i.e. the logos still has its impact on understanding the text. In the midst of the text's lack of origin or centre, comes the quotation to hire centrality, authority and originality to the text which builds its argument on the stability of the quotation.

'A text is not a text', says Derrida in his *Dissemination* (1972), 'unless it hides from the first comer, from the first glance, the law of its own composition and the rules of its game'. Its rules, he continues, 'can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could rigorously be called a perception'.³⁹ It is clear that Derrida's description of what is not-a-text coincides with the factual nature of the quotation itself. The quotation follows a pure structuralist sign-model and deductive logic which emphasize a transcendental signified in the analysis of its discourse. However, the text, for Derrida, is some sort of a living 'organism' whose 'tissues' are regenerated with every new reading. As the mythological sphinx, it gains a new life with every new reading and burns to death when a final word is said about its meaning, but it is never a final death. The text is revived again every time it is read, providing unexpected 'surprise' to the reader and disappointment to the one who thinks that he 'mastered the game' of perceiving its ultimate meaning. Nevertheless, the quotation is not an outside or inessential to the text, it is an intrinsic part of the textual totality, but it follows different rules of composition and perception. It is some sort of a defence strategy to provide evidence to the text. When the quotation is used, the text is never complete without it because, according to Derrida, if the text is already total and perfect, it would be impossible to add something for it. When an author quotes another, his text is no more than a 'less than total "totality"', or 'incomplete' totality without its quotations.⁴⁰ The quotation is supplementary to the text and here the text loses its purity since it needs the supplementation of the quoted text to support its meaning. It will not be a pure text, but a quotation-text structure. In this sense, the quotation complements what the text lacks: an inerasable origin, though not referring to its originary signature anymore, and a reassuring voice or hearing from a definite speaker his sound and breath, i.e. speech. Thus, we can reverse Derrida's equation, in *Of Grammatology*, by saying that writing (text) is in need of 'primary writing', or speech (quotation) to supplement its reading.

CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, the quotation deconstructs Derrida's deconstruction. It becomes a 'blindspot', 'aporia' or a point of 'self-contradiction' in which the text vacillates between what it deliberately means to say and how it is structured to mean. The quotation re-joins Derrida with the logocentric tradition because of his text's problematic: whether it belongs to speech or writing, or to both of them. In fact, he experiments with the complex structure of quotation/text, or speech/writing code-switching in which the quotation is an affirmative 'yes', an 'I am here', or unquestionable presence of a speaker that Derrida himself acknowledges to extend his deconstructive strategy. He says that 'the word yes ... travels like a quotation or a

rumour circulating, circumnavigating via the ear's labyrinth, that which we know only by hearsay'. Thus, 'yes' as the quotation is 'grammophonated'; 'a mark at once written and spoken, vocalised as a grapheme and written as phoneme'.⁴¹ The quotation compensates for the lack of centrality or origin in the language of the text. If we agree that the difference between quotation/text dichotomy is determined by the relationship between speech and writing, a general science of writing (grammatology) should not neglect the speech system which is part and parcel of writing itself. Therefore, as writing is 'the condition of the possibility of ideal objects and therefore of scientific objectivity', or 'the condition of the episteme',⁴² so is speech in the quotation. Writing is still deeply indebted to speech (direct quotation) as well as to the entire system of signification the quotation implies, all metaphysical concepts, including the concepts of 'soul', 'life', 'value', 'choice' and 'memory' that Derrida tries to avoid, especially in his early works. His method of critical reading (deconstruction) is bound to undermine its own claim to an absolute open meaning. In spite of his attempts to escape from the classical hierarchies of writing/speech, text/quotation, open/closed, absence/presence, he falls into the same old game by resorting to direct quotations in his writing. He ironically could not avoid the traditional concepts in the process of deconstructing them later on: 'It is not a question of "rejecting" these notions; they are necessary and... nothing is conceivable for us without them', says Derrida.⁴³ For him, as for Levi-Strauss who he criticizes in "Structure, Sign and Play", 'all these old concepts ... are employed to destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of which they themselves are pieces'.⁴⁴ The quotation still provides an (arche)origin of truth to the text and helps it to escape from the 'play' on its structure and content.

ACKNOWLEDGE

I would like to acknowledge all the generous efforts that I have received from the staff members of the ENCAP/Cardiff University/UK during the 12 months I have been a visiting scholar with them, especially Prof Neil Badmington and Prof Laurent Milesi with whom I have attended the modules: 'Reading Theory' and 'French Theory' respectively.

REFERENCE

1. *Claudette Sartiliot, Citation and Modernity: Derrida, Joyce and Brecht* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), p. 4.
2. *Jacques Derrida, "Des tours de Babel", trans. Joseph F. Graham, in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, vol. 1* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987 rep. 2007), p. 191.
3. *Matthew S. McGlone, "Contextomy: the art of quoting out of the context," in Media, Culture & Society* 27, 4 (2005), p. 513.
4. *Gerald Graff & Cathy Birkenstein, "They Say I Say": The Moves That Matter Academic Writing* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006), p. 43.
5. *Xiaoqiang Han, "Why Can't We Dispense with the Subject-Predicate Form without Losing Something More?" In Florida Philosophical Review* IX, 2 (2009), p.79.
6. *J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 12.
7. *Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," in Limited Inc, tras. Samuel Weber* (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1972 rep. 1988), p. 9.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Sartiliot, pp. 8-9.*

10. **Mikhail Bakhtin**, as cited in David Lodge's *After Bakhtin: Essays on Fiction and Criticism* (London: Routledge, 1990), p.97.
11. **Jacques Derrida**, *Of Grammatology*, trans. GayatriChakravortySpivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1967 rep. 1997), p. 11.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
13. **Derrida**, "Signature Event Context," p. 21.
14. **Derrida**, *Of Grammatology*, p.8.
15. **Julia Kristeva**, *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*, trans.s Thomas Gora, Alice Jordine& Leon S. Roudiez (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 6-7.
16. **Christopher Norris**, *Derrida*(London: Fontana Press, 1987), p.15
17. **Derrida**, *Of Grammatology*, p.8.
18. *Ibid.*, p.30.
19. **Jacques Derrida**, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" in *Acts of Religion*, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 1989 rep. 2002), p.244.
20. **Michel Foucault**, "What Is An Author?" (1969), in *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (vol. 1), ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et. al. (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 209.
21. **Jacques Derrida**, "Signsponge" (1975), in *Acts of Literature*, ed. Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 346.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 347.
23. As cited in Christopher Norris, *Deconstruction and The Interests of Theory*(London: Printer Publishers, 1988), p. 227.
24. **Derrida**, "Signsponge," p. 351.
25. **Derrida**, "Force of Law," p. 244.
26. **Jacques Derrida**, "The Parergon", trans. Craig Owens, *The MIT Press*, vol. 9 (1979), 3-13, p. 21.
27. **Norris**, *Deconstruction and The Interests of Theory*, p.187.
28. **Christopher Norris**, *Deconstruction* (London: Routledge, 1982 rep. 2002), p. 26.
29. **Derrida**, "The Force of Law," p. 236.
30. **Jacques Derrida**, *Spectres of Marx: The State of The Debt, The Work of Mourning and The New International*, Trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1993 rep. 1994), p. 391.
31. **Christopher Norris**, *Deconstruction and The Interests of Theory*, p. 190.
32. **Derrida**, *Of Grammatology*, p. 34.
33. **Christopher Wise**, *Derrida, Africa, and The Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 151.
34. **Marjorie Garber**, *Quotation Marks*(New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 15.
35. **Ruth Finnegan**, *Why Do We Quote? The Culture and History of Quotation* (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2011), p. 105.
36. **Derrida**, *Of Grammatology*, p. 3.

37. As Cited in William D. Melaney, *After Ontology: Literary Theory and Modernist Poetics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), p. 91.
38. *Ibid.*, p.90.
39. **Jacques Derrida**, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1972 rep.1981), p. 63.
40. **Niall Lucy**, *A Derrida Dictionary* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p. 136.
41. **Jacques Derrida**, "Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce," in *Acts of Literature*, p. 267.
42. **Derrida**, *Of Grammatology*, p.4.
43. *Ibid.*, p.13.
44. **Jacques Derrida**, "Structure, Sign and Play", in *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge, 1967 rep. 1978), p. 359.

AUTHOR DETAILS

Dr Areej M.J. Al-Khafaji is a professor of English Literature and Philosophy in the Centre of Translation and Language Studies at Al-Qadisiya University, Iraq. She is the best paper award winner of TRANS STELLAR / *IJEL* for authoring "Anthropoetic Investigation of Race, Gender and Identity in Wendy Rose's Poetry", Vol. 4, Issue 6 (2014), 63-72 and "The Semiotic Paradigm in T.S. Eliot's *Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats*", in *IJELLH* , Vol. II, Issue IV (August 2014), 436-453. Her only book is *Goethe's West-Eastern Divan: An Occidental Discourse of the Orient* (Najaf, 2012). Email: dr_areej1972@yahoo.com.